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Abstract
The term affordance has been inconsistently applied both in robotics and communica-
tion. While the robotics perspective is mostly object-based, the communication science 
view is commonly user-based. In an attempt to bring the two perspectives together, this 
theoretical paper argues that social robots present new social communicative affordances 
emerging from a two-way relational process. I first explicate conceptual approaches of 
affordance in robotics and communication. Second, a model of enacted communicative 
affordance in the context of Human-Machine Communication (HMC) is presented. Third 
and last, I explain how a pivotal social robot characteristic—embodiment—plays a key role 
in the process of social communicative affordances in HMC, which may entail behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive effects. The paper ends by presenting considerations for future 
affordance research in HMC.
Keywords: affordance, social robot, robotics, agency, interaction, human-machine 
communication
Introduction
Social robots have recently emerged as a new type of media with which we can commu-
nicate (Zhao, 2006). Social robots are quickly being adopted in our homes, they perform 
tasks in customer service, and can assist people with health issues or disabilities. Given their 
rapid spreading and their quickly improving capabilities, many regard the advent of social 
robots as part of the fourth industrial revolution (Cross et al., 2019). In their most sophisti-
cated form, social robots are able to recognize, talk with, and personalize their interactions 
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communication (HMC) social robots are regarded as a new type of interaction partner 
(e.g., Edwards et al., 2019).
Despite the spreading and importance of social robots, our understanding of HMC 
awaits further study (Peter & Kühne, 2018). Notably, albeit social robots increasingly acquire 
characteristics that, in principle, allow social or communicative uses, it is not clear whether 
people in fact perceive and act upon social robots as social and communicative entities. 
That is, we do not yet know whether social robots’ characteristics do result in social com-
municative affordances, or action possibilities for communication (Gibson, 1979). For this 
reason, this article’s first research question relates to what is the process of social commu-
nicative affordance formation when applied to human-machine communication (HMC). 
This, because we can hardly identify new social communicative affordances without under-
standing the process affordance formation first.
 Further and beyond this, it is also not clear whether the idiosyncratic characteristics of 
social robots, such as their body and face, promote social and communicative uses which 
are comparable to the types of uses that emerge in interpersonal interactions or during 
media exposure. Social robots may have a social or communicative function for people, but 
they may fulfill this function in a different way than what is known between humans face-
to-face or also when humans interact with each other through established communication 
technologies, such as Social Networking Sites (SNSs). Thus, it is conceivable that new forms 
of social interactions emerge in HMC. Wondering about how these salient social robot 
characteristics shape the interaction and effects from it brings this study’s second research 
question, that is, what is the role of a social robot’s embodiment in the process of social 
communicative affordance formation.
In the context of these pressing questions, I argue that the gap between social robots 
characteristics and people’s social and communicative actions can be bridged by integrat-
ing a refined conceptualization of affordances into HMC. Integrating these approaches is 
necessary, as the term affordance has been inconsistently defined in the past. For instance, 
in robotics affordances have been mostly conceptualized in terms of the capabilities of 
robots to physically interact in their environment, such as recognizing and lifting objects 
(Horton et al., 2012; Paauwe et al., 2015). In contrast, communication science views affor-
dances mostly in a human-centered way, focusing on what users can obtain from using 
technologies such as SNSs (boyd, 2010). While I readily acknowledge these important con-
tributions, in our view, in the context of HMC, extant conceptualizations of affordances 
are rooted in a view of technology as a tool or medium of communication which does not 
sufficiently reflect the new reality that social robots are social communicators (Zhao, 2006). 
To integrate these approaches, the present article first develops a conceptualization of affor-
dances which can be reasonably applied to HMC. Second, based on this conceptualization, 
I explain how physical embodiment lays in our view at the heart of enacted social commu-
nicative affordances between humans and social robots, particularly because of the sequen-
tial exchange of enhanced nonverbal communicative cues, such as haptic and audiovisual 
signals (e.g., voice intonation, facial expressions, physical touch). The study is structured 
as follows. I first explicate the conceptual underpinnings of the term affordance in both 
robotics and communication. Second, I examine main definitions of affordance and point 
to some inconsistencies in the conceptualization of the term. Third, and to shed light into 
the process of communicative affordance formation, I present a series of steps in a model of 
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enacted affordance, which in our view may help better illustrate our point that affordances 
are enacted, rather than only perceived, in the particular context of HMC. Fourth, I present 
embodiment as a crucial element in this enacted affordance process. Fifth, and to clarify, I 
exemplify how embodiment is crucial to allow enacted social affordances.
Grasping the Affordance Concept
Originally stemming from ecological psychology, the concept of affordance was first men-
tioned by Gibson: 
an affordance is what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, for good 
or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, the noun affordance is not. I 
have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and 
the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity 
of the animal and the environment. (Gibson, 1986, p. 127) 
According to Gibson, affordances can be regarded as a particular characteristic of the 
environment which automatically triggers (and allows) an animal to carry out an action. 
For instance, a goat facing a hill would automatically perceive it as “climbable” due to its 
uphill and inclined morphology and would proceed to climb it. Here, the hill’s morphology 
and shape are key to the action that is to be carried out. By extension, in the Gibsonian 
sense, the environment’s shape and morphology both enable and determine actions. How-
ever, scholars quickly pointed out that not only the environments’ characteristics, but also 
the capabilities of the animal influence which actions are performed. For instance, a goat 
is particularly skilled at climbing hills, whereas other animals, such as cows or butterflies, 
aren’t proficient climbers, and would thus interact with the hill in a way which fits their spe-
cific abilities. In short, we can thus note that affordances are to be understood as the relation 
between the characteristics of a living entity and its environment.
Affordances Applied to Technology
Norman (1999) discussed affordances in terms of the action possibilities that are perceived 
by actors. His focus on human actors involved a move away from fully automatic responses 
and a stronger emphasis on interpretative and social processes and their influence on per-
ceived action possibilities. For instance, when humans encounter a new tool, using it is 
likely to be the result of a cognitive evaluation of how it might be used and/or how other 
people use it, instead of a hard-wired automatic process. In line with this shifted focus, a 
newer definition of affordances appeared: “we view the affordances of an artifact as the 
possibilities (for both: thinking and doing) that are signified by users during their inter-
action with the artifact” (Vyas et al., 2006, p. 92). It is noteworthy that this newer view 
suggests that affordances are linked to social and subjective processes. Indeed, the social- 
constructionist view of affordances puts the emphasis on users and how they construct (sig-
nify) the meaning about the artifact, which is influenced by social and cultural factors. As 
we discuss below, this social-constructionist view is at odds with Gibson’s original concep-
tualization of affordances. However, it is exactly these differences between the Gibsonian 
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and the social-constructionist view which are important to develop a comprehensive con-
ceptualization of affordances in HMC.
The Relationship Between Affordance and Perception
As we have explained, in the Gibsonian conceptualization of affordance there exists an 
almost automatic relationship between perception and action. This notion of “direct percep-
tion,” “sense of immediacy,” or “automaticity” which is crucial in the Gibsonian framework, 
was critiqued by subsequent scholarship (see Stoffregen, 2003). For instance, cognitive sci-
entists argued that perception of an object and its action possibilities could by no means 
be an automatic process, as perception is influenced by other factors, such as the optical 
abilities of subjects, or the memory of past experiences with that object (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1981; Horton et al., 2012).
This debate on the automaticity of affordances led other scholars to develop more 
refined definitions. Relevantly, Norman (1999) applied affordances to technological envi-
ronments. He highlighted that affordances are first perceived, then enacted. For instance, 
when seeing a “clickable” button on a Web interface, Norman would reject to call the button 
itself strictly an affordance: “those displays are not affordances; they are visual feedback that 
advertise the affordances: they are the perceived affordances” (Norman, 2008). Therefore, 
if the person perceives a button as “clickable” and clicks on it and obtains a result (such as 
accessing another Web page), then the affordance manifests. This affordance could be, for 
instance, greater accessibility to more information online.
In addition, Norman (1999) posed that perceived affordances (e.g., the perceived pos-
sibilities for action) influence how people behave toward objects, especially technological 
ones. For instance, in the classic example of a chair, people may sit on it, lean on it, or even 
throw it to others depending on how people appraise its physical and social affordances 
(Pols, 2012). This conceptualization of perception as apart from action has found support 
in recent communication scholarship, which has considered “perceived affordances” (e.g., 
Fox & Holt, 2018) to be more precise. Further, dealing with the issue of affordance and per-
ception, Nagy & Neff (2015) brought the concept of “imagined affordance” to highlight the 
importance of imagination in the affordance formation process, as “expectations for tech-
nology that are not fully realized in conscious, rational knowledge” (p. 1). These authors 
implied that affordances are not only perceived, they are in a large part imagined by users. 
This user-centered view has been common in communication approaches to affordances, 
as we will see below.
The Concept of Affordances in Communication
The conception of technology acting as a communication channel between two or more 
people played a role in the latest conceptualizations of affordances, which viewed them as 
emerging from the use of technology as a medium of communication. For instance, the 
field of human-computer interaction (HCI) identified key perceived affordances such as 
interactivity, which could result from either interacting with the computer or technology 
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(e.g., clicking on a website link and gain access to new content), or emerging from com-
munication between two humans mediated by a computer (e.g., two humans interacting 
with each other through e-mail). Even more recent conceptualizations have focused on the 
role of technology as enabling humans to connect and spread personal content in newer 
ways, for instance through Social Networking Sites (SNSs). From there, the field centered 
on how these social network platforms empower users, allowing greater connectivity and 
the diffusion of their own user-generated content. For instance, the notion of the scalability 
affordance (boyd, 2010) is that the visibility of users’ content published in SNSs can easily 
escalate if other users reshare and spread content through various social networks. Other 
proposed affordances included persistence (online expressions are automatically recorded 
and archived) and searchability (online content can easily be accessed through search, 
boyd, 2010, p. 7).
In my view, a key recent communications approach on affordances proposed by Evans 
and colleagues (2016) emphasizes a relational view between people’s actions and technol-
ogy. In their definition of affordance, Evans et al. build on the relational view proposed by 
Faraj & Azad (2012), whom stated that: 
an affordance is a multifaceted relational structure, not just a single attribute or 
property or functionality of technology artifact or the actor. That is, affordance 
is often realized via the enactment of several mutuality relations between the 
technology, the artifact and the actor. (p. 254).
In my view, this definition emphasizes that affordances emerge enacted as a result of 
different relationships, which this article posits are a series of interrelated steps in the com-
municative process. 
Consequently, Evans and colleagues (2016) focused on this relational stance and pro-
vided a conceptual definition of affordance as: “‘the multifaceted relational structure’ (Faraj 
& Azad, 2012, p. 254) between an object/technology and the user that enables or constraints 
potential behavioral outcomes in a particular context.” From these definitions, it can be 
inferred that communication scholars mostly adhere to a conceptualization of affordances 
as a “multifaceted structure” and emphasize its relational character between the object, the 
features of the object, and the user. Moreover, Evans and colleagues proposed three criteria 
to assess whether a particular action would qualify as an affordance: (a) the affordance is 
neither the object nor the feature of the object; (b) the proposed affordance is not an out-
come; and (c) the proposed affordance has variability. For (a) the authors explain that a “fea-
ture” represents a tool or attribute (p. 39) “that enables activity by part of the user” (Smock 
et al., 2011, p. 2323). For instance, the authors pose that a built-in camera on a phone is a 
feature, a tool which can be activated by the user, while the fact that one can capture photos 
or video, brings about the affordance of recordability. For (b), the outcomes, they argue that 
for example, easily finding a picture of someone we try to contact online, searching online 
for it for example, is an outcome of the affordance of accessibility (i.e., online content can 
easily be accessed, boyd, 2010). For (c) variability, Evans and colleagues propose that the 
affordance of visibility may vary (i.e., a photo may become more or less visible online).
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Reassessing Communicative Affordances
While I see much value in Evans et al. (2016) affordance definition and assessment criteria, 
such an “elastic” or interrelated conceptualization of affordances, at least when applied to 
HMC, may not allow for an explanation of all the constitutive elements of the perceived 
affordance process. Moreover, I believe that this valuable cornerstone definition provided 
by Evans and colleagues could be specified in three main ways. First, as I have shown in 
the previous sections, this definition could include user perception, as it is how interaction 
partners perceive the technology and the possibilities for action it allows, that which brings 
affordances. Here, I take distance from this “direct link” theorized by Gibson between per-
ception and action, and are lenient to more current approaches, which signal that any effort 
to measure affordances should focus on perceived affordances. Second, this definition does 
not consider the issue of user agency. Agency is the feeling of oneself being the initiator of 
an action, the sense of self obtained through the perceived control over the social world 
(Brandi et al., 2019). Following these authors, I argue that any communicative situation 
between social actors includes agency, as the source A (for instance the human), should be 
willing to initiate a series of social actions (e.g., eye contact, making a question), and then 
receive feedback from source B (the social robot) to that action (e.g., returning eye contact, 
answering the question). Following from this, I posit that it is not enough to be aware of the 
potential uses of technology, users need to want to use a technology as part of their personal 
agency with the objective of fulfilling a personally relevant goal.
Third and last, Evans et al.’s (2016) definition does not really specify what outcomes are. 
Strictly speaking, everything can be an outcome, including affordances. For instance, per-
sistence, argued by some scholars to be an affordance, can be an outcome from the action of 
image data capture. Or if a user willingly decides to never erase a social media post, content 
persistence is then also an outcome of that users’ decision, apart from the particular features 
of the technology itself (e.g., servers with enough storage capacity to store personal content 
online). In this respect, I would like to specify that this paper defines outcomes in the con-
text of HMC as the behavioral, attitudinal, and cognitive effects emerging from interactions 
with social robots. As we have seen, the concept of affordance has faced various definitions 
and approaches, which are not usually consistent. One example of a different approach is 
that of robotics, which I proceed to briefly discuss hereunder.
The Concept of Affordance in Robotics
The traditional application of affordances in robotics has focused heavily on how the robot 
moves and physically deals with objects and elements in the environment. For instance, how 
does the robot successfully enact movement (walk, jump, run, e.g., Kuindersma et al., 2016), 
how it can distinguish different elements, such as objects, people, faces, landscapes (e.g., 
Dag et al., 2010), or how it can perform fine motor skills activities (e.g., push, lift, grasps 
objects) (e.g., Detry et al., 2011). Equally important for the robot to function well in the 
environment is the ability to avoid certain objects, which has been termed the traversability 
affordance (Uğur & Şahin, 2010). In other words, because sensing, planning, and execut-
ing are three major processes that robots must carry out to implement proper short-term 
responses and execute tasks in their environment (Brooks, 1986), the field of robotics has 
Rodríguez-Hidalgo 61
conceptualized affordances mostly in terms of these functions. Although recent approaches 
have considered how robots should deal with humans in the environment, however, this 
work is nonetheless still focused on physical domains (i.e., how a robot can use wheels to 
bypass or transit near a human, Lindler & Eschenback, 2011).
In my view, though valuable, these approaches leave aside a more comprehensive per-
spective which considers the robots’ capacity to act socially toward other social actors 
in the environment. Robots have recently undergone significant developments and have 
acquired the capacity to socially interact with humans and provide meaningful behaviors 
and responses (Guzman, 2018; Zhao, 2006). In line with previous scholars who have pro-
posed to focus on the processes and effects emerging from the interaction between humans 
and robots (e.g., Edwards et al., 2019), I argue here that these new capabilities bring a new 
social affordance to social robots, that is their capacity to sustain meaningful social inter-
actions with humans. To make this point, I bring together affordance approaches from 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) and human-robot interaction (HRI), to exem-
plify how these approaches see technology as a medium or tool through which humans can 
communicate.
Bringing Approaches Together
As I have shown, the concept of affordances has faced inconsistent focus in two importantly 
related fields relevant to HMC, such as robotics and communication. While one is object-
based, the other has been fully user-based. Further, even though we see enormous value in 
the relational approach to affordances such as those of Evans and colleagues (2016), I have 
shown how this approach could be made more specific in three important ways. Therefore, 
because this study’s goal is to provide a more specific definition of the process of affordance 
formation, as it follows from the introduction to formally ask:
R.Q.1 = what is the process of enacted affordance formation applied to 
human-machine communication (HMC)?
As establishing conceptual clarity of the process of enacted communicative affordances 
represents a first step toward conceptualizing and identifying characteristics of social robots 
which may importantly influence affordances, we can deal now with the second goal of this 
theoretical article, which is to identify some crucial characteristics of social robots which 
may bring forth affordances. A characteristic which has been considered to be crucial in 
the definition of a social robot is that of physical embodiment. “Social robots are embodied 
agents . . . able to recognize each other and engage in social interactions” (Fong et al., 2003, 
p. 144). This body enables them to both perceive and act socially in their environment 
(Paauwe et al., 2015). Further, an agents’ corporality is intrinsically related to how the body 
allows the robot not only to sense its environment and act in response to it, but also to exert 
an action as an agent in the environment (Wiltshire et al., 2013).
In addition, physical embodiment appears to be closely tied to a sense of agency, which 
is linked to sensorimotor processes such as touch and movement. Touch and physical prox-
imity allow a social robot to enter the persons’ intimate physical sphere (Altman & Tay-
lor, 1973) and to be able to share interpersonal touch with humans. These haptic cues are 
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essential to create a feeling of bonding, emotional warmth, and intimacy (Knapp & Hall, 
1992). These arguments may evidence that the social affordances of HMC would follow 
a different process compared to, for instance, communicating with a computer. Further, 
several studies have found that physically embodied robots appear to be more engaging 
and compelling to communicate with compared to an avatar, for instance (e.g., Kiesler et 
al., 2008). Following these considerations, this study’s second research question is formally 
asked, following from the introduction:
R.Q.2 = what is the role of the embodiment in the process of enacted social  
robots’ affordances?
First Research Question: The Process of Enacted Communicative 
Affordance
This article’s first research question asked about the process of affordance formation, applied 
to human-machine communication, that is the human communicating with a social robot 
and vice versa. I consider this a two-way process and therefore the social robot is consid-
ered as an interaction partner with equal social standing than the human. Building on the 
affordance conceptualization by Faraj & Azad (2012) and Evans et al. (2016), I provide here 
a definition of communicational affordances as both perceived and enacted possibilities 
for social interaction in a two-way iterative communication process, which emerges in the 
enactment of an integrated, sequential relational system which brings attitudinal, cogni-
tive, and behavioral effects in both communication partners. Relevantly, because this is a 
communicational model in the context of HMC, I consider social affordances as emerging 
from a process of perceived and enacted communicative behaviors or actions between both 
partners, either the human or the social robot, which they perform in sequential fashion 
following an interaction and enabled by both their perception and their agency. In the case 
of the social robot, social agency is achieved through choosing from a myriad of interac-
tion possibilities to respond or to initiate interaction with a human. Already, when fac-
ing communication with a human, social robots must choose between several alternatives 
which have been programmed. In the future, as social robots become more autonomous 
and sophisticated, their sense of all these interrelated steps will have increased importance 
and may become smoother and more automatized.
This paper definition of affordance considers communicational affordances as socially 
“enacted” because in my view, it does not suffice to just perceive possibilities for action with 
an object, it is actually the social actor (the person or the robot), who should ultimately 
enact the behavior to obtain a result from this social action. For instance, it does not suffice 
to perceive the social robot as a possible interaction partner, nor our intention and desire 
to talk to it which brings forth social affordances of meaningful social interaction. It is the 
combination of these factors plus their enactment which brings forth the social affordance 
of interactivity, for instance. For further clarity, I posit that the process outlined in Figure 1 
would bring forth, “enact” a social affordance in the context of HMC.
Following the theoretical considerations presented in this paper, I first provide an 
account of the steps in the process of social affordance formation: (a) what the social agent 
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perceives in the environment (the characteristics and features of the subject); (b) what that 
subject represents to the agent in terms of action possibilities, or the actions that the social 
agent perceives or imagines it can perform with the subject; (c) the actions that the social 
agent is willing to carry out (agency); (d) carrying out the interaction. After performing 
the social action, subsequently, the response of the second agent goes through the same 
sequence of steps (e, f, g, h). If the social agent decides to respond (h), then comes the result 
of the social action for the first agent (i).
Social object
perception

















a b c d
h igfe
Initiator of social interaction (agent A)
Response to the social interaction (agent B)
FIGURE 1 Model of Enacted Social Communicative Affordance  
Between a Human and a Social Robot and Vice Versa
The model of the process of enacted social affordance between a human and a social robot 
and vice versa, is seen on Figure 1. The semi-circular double-sided arrows to the left signal 
that this process is iterative, that is to say, after a social action is started by one social agent 
A (either the human or the social robot), the other agent B can choose to respond to the 
interaction and so on subsequently. First, the process takes place from the upper left square 
to the right. Then, as was already stated, after the social action by agent A is performed, the 
social agent B perceives this enacted social action and goes through the same process, from 
the down left square toward the right. All this process continues to the right until agent B 
responds. Ultimately, this response from agent B ends up by having an outcome on agent 
A. We exemplify the model in more detail within the next research question. I approach 
research question 2, regarding the role of embodiment in the process of enacted affordance.
Second Research Question: The Role of Embodiment in Social 
Affordances
This study’s second research question asked about the role of the embodiment in the process 
of enacted social robots’ affordance. Importantly, this paper views stimulus or robot charac-
teristics not as affordances. Rather, these characteristics represent stimuli which influence 
the process of communicative enacted affordances by making some aspects more salient 
(e.g., presence of a physical body, presence of a mouth). Although providing a complete 
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account of the role of embodiment is out of scope in the present theoretical study, it is used 
here to exemplify the model of enacted social communicative affordance below.
a) What the social agent perceives in the environment (e.g., the characteristics and 
features of the subject).
Both the person and the social robot possess a body and social attributes such as 
body shape (e.g., presence of arms or legs), height, and facial features such as eyes 
and mouth. These elements will imply that both agents simply notice each other in 
a shared physical space.
b) What the social object represents to the agent in terms of action possibilities.
The physical characteristics of both agents makes it that both see each other as 
possible social interaction partners. Considering that agent A sees agent B as a social 
agent and vice versa, this implies a number of perceived or imagined interaction 
possibilities; for instance, physically approaching the subject, waving, making eye 
contact, or initiating a voice-based conversation.
c) The actions that the social agent is willing to carry out (agency).
After noticing distinct action possibilities and considering response possibilities 
of the other agent B, both agents will use their sense of agency to either begin an 
interaction or to respond to it. We posit that this agency will respond to varied 
personal goals of both agents, which range from socializing or learning new 
information. Embodiment plays a role here, because it enables action possibilities 
which include physicality; for instance, giving each other a hand, patting on the 
shoulder, or getting more proximally close.
d) Carrying out the social action.
Agent A initiates the social action, which for example can be making eye contact, 
touching agent B, or initiating a dialogue. Embodiment enables these possibilities 
for social action because it crucially allows for embodied nonverbal language 
which can be encoded and decoded by both interaction partners. Crucially, it 
allows for physical proximity and touch of both communication partners. The 
robot is able to use its body to interact or send interaction signals. For instance, in 
the case of interacting with an anthropomorphic robot the agent has a number of 
“symbolic” features such as eyes or mouth to imply a certain nonverbal expression 
(i.e., interest), or can reach its arms to touch the person, or its legs to walk toward 
the person.
e) The results of this social action.
Lastly, the social action would bring a certain outcome. Agent B will respond to the 
social initiation by agent A and go through the same process as agent A to initiate a 
response. This response will trigger an outcome in agent A. Importantly, outcomes 
are conceived here as the behavioral, attitudinal/emotional, and cognitive effects 
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emerging from the social interaction. Embodiment plays a key role in the behavioral 
component I argue, because if for instance the conversation is running smoothly 
and agent A receives a suitable response from agent B, a behavioral reaction of 
agent A could be to decrease body distance between both agents, since they may 
increase their liking of the social robot. The emotional component is also affected 
by embodiment, as both parties presumably have a face and body, which can be 
used to express and read emotions by means of facial expressions in the other. 
Both agents’ facial expressions and verbal communication have the potential of 
creating emotional outcomes in both partners. Lastly, cognitive effects are possible, 
provided that both agents, for example, cognitively process the interaction with 
one another, and for instance agent A, the human, learned new information thanks 
to the answer from agent B. An agent B can “read” and interpret both the verbal 
and nonverbal language provided by agent A and thus adapt their interaction 
depending on its goal.
Discussion
This theoretical paper had as its main aim to describe and define social communicative 
affordances with a focus on their formative process, in the setting of a social interaction 
between a human and a social robot. Further, it meant to identify a series of steps which 
may present themselves in the process of enacted communicative affordances in HMC. 
Although the present approach clearly has limitations—an important one being that its 
conceptualization is purely theoretical—I believe that a strength of our approach is that 
of presenting a comprehensive yet detailed account of the process of enacted communi-
cative affordance formation in the context of HMC, considering the contributions of sev-
eral affordance approaches. I am convinced that this approach can illuminate and enrich 
the discourse and research on HMC, for instance by distinguishing between perceived and 
enacted affordance and by presenting a scheme of the overall process of communicative 
affordance.
An innovative aspect of the present approach is that it considers the robot in equal 
social standing than the human in a communicative situation. Although this idea may seem 
unrealistic to some nowadays considering current social robot capabilities, particularly 
regarding their agency and nonverbal language expression, we believe that as social robots 
will become even more autonomous and social in the future, that the presented approach 
can be applied to better understand the new social affordances brought by social robots 
and can be of significant value to conceptualize perceived communicative affordances and 
assess effects from enacted affordances of HMC in the future.
 The contributions of this study can be better understood by highlighting three concep-
tual remarks. These are: (1) stimulus or robot characteristics are not affordances; (2) robot 
characteristics influence possible enacted affordances; (3) the process of enacted affordances 
influence communication or interaction with robots and HMC outcomes. With regards to 
(1), it is not our aim to say that embodiment is an affordance per se, but rather that it is a 
salient social robot stimulus characteristic which is separate from perceived and enacted 
affordance. Although I am aware that the notion of embodiment may be rather controver-
sial as accounting for social effects in robotics, it has been suggested that the very notion 
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of an intelligent autonomous machine cannot exist without a body. “Intelligence requires 
a physical instantiation a body” (Pfeifer & Scheier, 1999). Having a body would thus inte-
grate the conceptualizations of possessing a social intelligence, and entails occupying the 
same physical 3-D space with the interaction partner and further allows for visual, auditory, 
and especially haptic nonverbal communication, all key aspects to make social robots seem 
more personable and able to establish meaningful social relationships with humans.
With regards to (2), as I have postulated, this paper proposes that social robots possess 
unique characteristics which may influence both perceived and enacted affordances. Exam-
ples have been provided regarding embodiment, but it is my intention to leave open for 
further research to identify which other unique social robot characteristics render which 
social affordances could be enacted through HMC. As for (3), and crucial to this study’s 
proposition, affordances influence interactions with social robots and HMC outcomes. For 
instance, there is ground to assume that the affordances of interactivity and customization 
may bring a number of behavioral outcomes, such as more frequent interaction with the 
social robot, emotional outcomes such as greater closeness and liking, and/or lastly, cogni-
tive outcomes such as learning.
Future work could test and/or expand this approach by attempting to establish the 
empirical relationship between perceived and enacted affordances in the context of HMC. 
Although this paper does not propose per se that affordances are measurable (a view toward 
which other scholars seem skeptical, considering the concept’s relational structure), this 
paper poses that considering the steps of the affordance formation process (e.g., making the 
distinction between perceived and enacted affordance and the formation steps throughout), 
may be meaningful and at least theoretically relevant. In a similar fashion, future scholarship 
could consider whether and to what extent affordances commonly discussed in the context 
of other media (e.g., the locatability and portability of cell phones) (Schrock, 2015), play a 
role in the communicative affordance formation process of social robots. Lastly, to increase 
our knowledge in the field, this social affordance process could be discussed and researched 
in the context of communicating with other nonhuman forms of communicative agents, 
such as algorithms or virtual AI assistants. A last and important issue to consider is the 
context and factors in which enacted communicative affordances and their possible effects 
can be explicated. Obviously, situational, environmental, individual factors, and predispo-
sitions can affect enacted affordances. Ultimately, I am hopeful that by presenting a focused 
yet relational perspective to enacted affordances, this may help with comprehending how 
people interact and what they obtain from social robots, namely the capacity of meaning-
ful social interaction. Important here is the notion that both interaction partners ascribe 
meaning to socially communicating with one another (Guzman, 2018). This is important 
to generate behavioral, emotional, and cognitive outcomes from interacting with social 
robots, outcomes which are very relevant to study now and in the future.
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